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upon Hel'vering mi Gerhardfl9 and its reiteration of the statement that a non-
discriminatory tax on an employee of the national or state government is but
the normal incident of the organization within the same territory of two
governments, each possessing the taxing power; but then it goes beyond the
Gerhardt decision by stating there is no implied restriction in the constitution
prohibiting such taxation. This would seem to give a strong basis for pre-
diction that the court may not concede to Congress the power to declare
the employees or officers of the federal government or its instrumentalities
immune from non-discriminatory taxation.
The Court has not taken a direct stand on the immunity of income from
government bonds.20 This leaves the question of whether or not the Court
will make a distinction between the borrowing power and the employing
power so as also to remove the implied immunity from interest on govern-
mental bonds and obligations, state or federal. The same result should follow
in either case if the court is to be consistent, but what the Court will actually
decide is a matter for conjecure.
However, since the Supreme Court has failed to exercise a complete use
of its eraser, it will be interesting to watch whether the next step will be
another use of the eraser or the use of the pen. I. K.
TAXATION-MULTIPLE DoMICIL.-Edward Green was born in England in
1868, was educated in Vermont and New York, voted and carried on business
in Texas from 1892 to 1911, was later engaged in business in New York, and
after 1927 spent most of his time in Massachusetts and Florida alternating
from one state to another thereby successfully evading taxes. Until his death,
in 1936, he maintained that his domicil was in Texas. Texas, Florida, Massa-
chusetts, and New York tax officials threatened to treat him as if he were
domiciled in their respective jurisdictions at the time of his death and thus
subject to their inheritance taxes on his intangible property wherever located.
Since the aggregate of these taxes and the Federal Estate Tax would exceed
the net value of the estate by over a million and a half dollars, and as Texas
had little of the estate in its jurisdiction to levy on, there was danger of
inability to enforce its tax. Therefore, Texas brought this original action
against the other states in the United States Supreme Court in the nature of a
bill of interpleader to get a determination of the domicil of decedent. Taking
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court found the decedent's domicil was in Massa-
chusetts at the time of death. Texas v. Florida (1939), 59 S. Ct. 563.
The jurisdiction to impose inheritance taxes on intangibles follows the
domicil of the decedent; thus the determination of domicil is a jurisdictional
issue.1 Although it is a well accepted common law rule that a person can
have but one domicil, nevertheless, on occasion two states have found the
same person to be domiciled for tax purposes within their respective borders
at the same time. The United States Supreme Court has refused to take
19 (1938), 304 U. S. 405, 58 S. Ct. 969.
20 It is admitted that this problem was not in issue in the instant case.
I Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minn. (1930), 208 U. S. 204, 74 L. ed. 371,
50 Sup. Ct. 98, 65 A. L. R. 1000; First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine (1932),
284 U. S. 312, 76 L. ed. 313, 52 Sup. Ct. 174, 77 A L. R. 1401.
RECENT CASE NOTES
jurisdiction on appeal even though a constitutional question of due process of
law would seem to have been raised inasmuch as it is obvious one of the
states was assuming jurisdiction over a matter not within its power. 2 Like-
wise an attempt to use the device of interpleader as sanctioned by the Federal
Interpleader Act was defeated on the grounds that such a suit would be
permitting the executor, a citizen of one state, to sue the interpleaded state
contrary to the Eleventh Amendment.3
The refusal of the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction in these situatione
has brought about a result contrary to the declared policy of preventing
multiple taxation. To remedy this inconsistency has been the problem of law
commentators as well as of wealthy persons who have a roving disposition. 4
The present case is a favorable response to these efforts to break down one
of the few remaining vestiges of once tolerated multiple inheritance taxation.5
How decisive is the present case in solving the multiple domicil enigma?
At the outset it must be admitted that the case can be distinguished from prior
ones in that here the procedure used was different and the facts were unique.
The action was brought under the general equity power to entertain bills
in the nature of interpleader to protect the estate from being consumed by the
inconsistent claims of the various states. The fact that the total of the Federal
Estate Tax and the states' inheritance taxes would exceed the net value of the
estate gave the court grounds to find a justiciable issue between the states.
Would there be presented a justiciable issue if the estate were ample to
pay the threatened taxes? Realizing that there must be an injury to the
sovereign power of the state in order to present such an issue wherein the
United States Supreme Court will take jurisdiction,6 it seems that the answer
2 Dorrance's Estate (1932), 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303, cert. den. (1933),
287 U. S. 660, 77 L. ed. 570, 53 Sup. Ct. 222; Dorrance's Estate (1934), 115
N. J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 601, and (1934), 116 N. J. Eq. 204, 172 A. 503; affirmed
in Dorrance v. Martin (1936), 116 N. J. L. 362, 184 A. 743, cert. den. (1936),
298 U. S. 678, 80 L. ed. 1399, 56 Sup. Ct. 449. See 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 177;
Harper, Final Determination of Domicil in United States (1934), 9 Ind. L.
J. 586.
3 Worchester County Tr. Co. v. Riley (1937), 302 U. S. 292, 82 L. ed. 268,
58 Sup. Ct. 185.
4 For a summary of the proposed remedies, see: Federa, Multiple Domicil
in Inheritance Taxation (1939), 16 Tax Magazine 142; 46 Yale L. J. 1235.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the present case, suggests that domicil
is no longer, a real and practicable basis for inheritance taxation contact point
for jurisdiction. He emphasizes the changes brought about by the modern mode
and prevalence of travel.
Blodgett v. Silberman (1928), 277 U. S. 1, 72 L. ed. 749, 48 Sup. Ct. 410
seems to have removed possibility of taxing on basis of situs of certificates of
intangibles.
5 For a discussion of the extent of the trend to eliminate multiple taxation,
see Brown, Multiple Taxation by the States-What is Left of It? (1935), 48
Hare. L. Rev. 407.
6 For a justiciable issue the sovereign rights of the state must be threatened
or injured. Massachusetts v. Mellon (1922), 262 U. S. 447, 485, 43 Sup. Ct. 597,
600. The taxpayer will have to show that the state's power to collect the tax is
being threatened. The greater the number and size of the claims by the
various states, the more probability there is that the Supreme Court will find
a justiciable issue; thus the decedent who has given only two states grounds
to claim his domicil will be in a weaker position than one who traveled more
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must be in the negative. The language and decision of the present case indi-
cate that the court will not extend its jurisdiction beyond the particular fact
situation, but as Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, ironically observes:
"But legal doctrines have, in an odd kind of way, the faculty of self-generating
extension." 7
If the present case proves to be as narrow as it purports, there remain
the other slow, expensive, and perhaps inappropriate remedies proposed to
solve the multiple tax domicil problem. In the face of such alternatives
as to remedy, it appears that the wealthy "traveler" can well profit by exer-
cising the greatest of care in creating this important jurisdictional fact of
domicil. The present case offers an elucidation of the elements that are
universally accepted as controlling: "Residence in fact coupled with purpose
to make place of residence one's home, are the essential elements of domicile,"
states Mr. Justice Stone.
From the practical standpoint the wealthy wise will save his estate expense
and uncertainty by establishing beyond doubt his domicil in one state; whereas
the estates of those who are not so fortunate will have to bear the expense of
litigation in which the present case will give at least a possible avenue of
escape from the heavy burden of multiple taxation. L. N. M.
WILLS-POWER OF APPOINTMENT-EXERCISE OF THE PowER.-Testator died
leaving two children to whom he devised his estate in equal shares; he
gave his son's share outright, but the share of the daughter he devised in
trust for her use during her life, and upon her death, he ordered the trustees
to "pay and divide the principal of such share to and among such of her
children . . . as she shall by her will appoint." Upon failure effectually to
exercise the power, the property was to go over to her children in equal
shares. The daughter thereafter died leaving two children and she attempted
by will to exercise the power of appointment by creating separate trusts for
her children during life with power of appointment in the children. The
decree of the lower court holding this a valid exercise of the power was
reversed on appeal since the power was held to be limited and special and
could be effectively exercised only in the way provided by the testator. In re
Kennedy's Will (N. Y. 1938), 18 N. E. (2d) 146.
The general rule, with which this note is concerned, goes back to the
early seventeenth century and provides that "under a general power to
appoint, or a power to appoint limited merely as to the objects, the donee
is not restricted to an appointment in fee simple, but may appoint lesser or
and established a shadow of domicil in three or more states. This result
protects those who are the more elaborate rovers. It would seem that the
result is 'unfortunate. Perhaps, therefore, the court will be liberal in finding
an injury threatened to the state; thereby circumventing the result of
Worchester County Tr. Co. v. Riley (1937), 302 U. S. 392, 82 L. ed. 268,
58 Sup. Ct. 185.
7 Mr. Justice Frankfurter comments on the extent of the holding in the
present case thus: "To find decedent could not on self-serving grounds elect
to make his home in Texas 'where he in fact had no residence' and yet to
retain the bill and dispose of it on its merits amounts in effect to a declaration
of rights on behalf of the estate which could not be adjudicated otherwise
than through the screen of a controversy between states."
